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      ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper considers developments which have necessitated greater involvement and a 
greater role for the central bank in financial regulation and supervision. The aftermath of the 
2007/08 financial crisis has witnessed the enactment of legislation such as the Banking Act of 
2009 which has not only introduced greater statutory powers for the central bank, but also 
the Special Resolution Regime. As well as a consideration of arguments which are in favour 
of the central bank’s role as supervisor and lender of last resort, the importance of central 
bank independence and safeguards which exist to ensure that sufficient accountability is 
fostered, will be considered. Safeguards and accountability mechanisms which are adequate, 
such that, whilst ensuring that the regulator is not susceptible to regulatory capture, do not 
impede the ability of such a regulator to obtain vital and necessary information from 
systemically important individual financial institutions. In its support of the view that central 
banks should assume a greater role in supervision, this paper not only seeks to justify why 
such a degree of involvement is vital to ensuring and maintaining stability in the financial 
system, but also those factors which are considered to be necessary if such a role is to be 
effective. 
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Central Bank’s Role and Involvement in Bank Regulation: Lender of Last Resort 
Arrangements and the Special Resolution Regime (SRR) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In considering the importance of the central bank’s independence in prudential supervision and 
whether such importance necessitates the adoption of legal provisions which would ensure such 
independence, this paper will commence with a brief overview of developments which have 
highlighted the growing importance of liquidity. It will then consider existing central bank 
arrangements in selected jurisdictions and the central bank’s role in maintaining stability within the 
financial system. The next section will focus on developments will have lead to the introduction of the 
Special Resolution Regime in some jurisdictions whilst other jurisdictions are still deliberating on the 
matter. Central bank independence, with particular focus on central bank financial and operational 
independence, will then be elaborated on. This section will also consider arguments in favour of and 
against central bank independence. The concluding sections comprise of discussions on measures 
which have been introduced in the aftermath of the recent Financial Crises and why such measures 
will serve as suitable and necessary complements to previous and present measures aimed at 
safeguarding central bank independence. In concluding this paper, one of its aims is to highlight the 
conflicts which exist between the central bank’s independence and the goal of maintaining and 
achieving stability within the financial system– particularly where adequate safeguards are not in 
place. 
 
 
 
 
Ever increasing importance of liquidity and the role of the central bank as lender of last resort 
 
 
From the events witnessed during the 2007/2008 Financial Crisis, the increased importance of 
liquidity, maturity mismatches, and the degree of interconnection between banks, make the central 
bank’s role as a lender of last resort even more important. The ease with which an asset could be 
traded was also a prominent feature of the Crisis.1 Even though it has been argued that investment 
banks are not systemically important2, any bank which has a high degree of “interconnection” with 
other banks should be considered systemically important. As the fifth largest investment bank in the 
US, Bear Stearns played a significant role in the credit default swaps market, acted as prime broker to 
many hedge funds and was not only a primary dealer in the bond market, but also a counter party to 
many prominent Wall Street firms.3 In the words of one Fed official, “ Bear Stearns was too 
interconnected to be allowed to fail at a time when financial markets are extremely fragile”.4 
 
Central banks’ roles as lenders of last resort arrangements and their oversight of systemically vital 
financial institutions is becoming increasingly acknowledged as a reason for an extension of their 
involvement in regulation and supervision of the financial system. Some reasons attributed to the 
central bank’s ability to play such a vital role in supervision relate to:5 Its ability to provide liquidity 
                                                 
1 See C Reinhart and A Felton, ‘The First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century: Part II, June – December 
2008 < http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13604> at page 5. For further information on how a problem in sub 
prime mortgages, estimated to be less than 1% of the world’s debt stock triggered a series of failures throughout 
the financial system, see ibid 
2 “In the sense that no investment bank performs tasks that cannot be performed readily and with comparable 
effectiveness by other institutions” see W Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises at page 99.  
3 See K Guha ‚ Fed Moves To Minimise Systemic Risk’ The Financial Times March 14 2008 
4 ibid 
5 See W Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises (Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
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privately – by virtue of the vast amounts of liquid assets in its reserves; its ability to maintain 
sufficient liquidity - such that it can manage its business when markets operate at normal levels of 
liquidity. It also has access to sufficient liquidity through credit lines and swaps, for example. 
 
Maintaining the close involvement of national central banks in prudential supervision has been 
highlighted by the European Central Bank (ECB) as a vital pre requisite, not only in facilitating the 
Euro system’s adequate contribution to monitoring risks to financial stability in the Euro zone, but also 
in ensuring smooth coordination between central bank functions which are carried out at supra 
national level and supervisory functions carried out at national level.6 It has been observed that since 
the start of the Crisis, the ECB has complained of a lack of information on banks which have the 
potential to trigger systemic failures.7 Further, the existence of legal impediments to the sharing of 
information between national regulators in the Euro zone and the ECB has been noted.8 An approach 
whereby a European system of supervisory agencies consisting of national prudential agencies which 
would be aggregated within a single supervisory system with cross border structures – similar to the 
European System of Central Banks, has been proposed.9 Further, a European prudential supervisory 
agency would not only be responsible for strategic supervisory decisions, but also the design of 
policies10. It would also assist in the resolution of disputes between home and country supervisors.11 
 
The task of harmonisation in the area of bank regulation and supervision in the Euro zone however, 
appears to be a daunting one. Given the diverse structures of regulation across Euro member states, it 
is not so difficult to understand why the ECB has no formal supervisory role.12The recommendations 
of the Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, which are aimed at re 
building the structure of financial regulation and supervision in the EU, consist of three new 
elements.13 
 
 
Financial crises such as those of Northern Rock, IKB and Hypo Real Estates in Europe, have lead to a 
review of arrangements involving the central banks in the jurisdictions concerned. The occurrence of 
these crises also highlighted the need for a special resolution regime and a “bridge bank” whose aims 
are to address the needs of failing banks.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
City’s symposium on “Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System”, at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 
on August 21-23, 2008) at page 31 
6 LB Smaghi, ‘Central Bank Independence in the EU: From Theory to Practice’ European Law Journal, Vol. 14, 
No. 4, July 2008, p454 
7 W Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises (Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 
symposium on “Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System”, at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on 
August 21-23, 2008) at page 113 
8 ibid 
9 See J Lawson and S Barnes and Marte Sollie ‘Financial Market Stability in the European Union: Enhancing 
Regulation and Supervision’ Economics Department Working Paper No. 670 page 37 and also D 
Schoenmaker and S Oosterloo, “Financial Supervision in Europe: A Proposal for a New 
Architecture”, in: L. Jonung, C. Walkner and M. Watson (eds), Building the Financial Foundations 
of the Euro - Experiences and Challenges, 2008 Routledge, London. 
<http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2009doc.nsf/LinkTo/NT00000C9A/$FILE/JT03259984.PDF> (last visited 11 
June 2009) 
10 ibid 
11 ibid 
12 See W Buiter Central Banks and Financial Crises at page 113 
13 See W Nier, ‘Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from the Crisis’ IMF 
Working Paper WP/09/70 April 2009 at pages 21 and 22; Also see De Larosière, 2009, “Report of the High-level 
Group on Financial Supervision in the EU,” Brussels, Feb 25, 2009. These elements comprise of a macro 
prudential authority (ESRC), a micro prudential authority (ESFS) and a consolidation of sectoral committees 
such as those of the CEBS,CEIOPS and CESR which elevates their status to that of “authorities” which are 
conferred specific powers aimed at guaranteeing consistent supervision across the EU. 
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Existing arrangements in Germany and the UK 
 
In contrast to the UK where the Bank of England is not really involved in the supervision of financial 
institutions, the German Central Bank, the Deutsche Bundesbank, not only assists BaFin in exercising 
supervision over credit and financial institutions, but is also in charge of ongoing monitoring of credit 
institutions. Parliament had good reasons for involving the Bundesbank through section 7 of the 
Banking Act in the banking supervision process.14The Bundesbank is involved in basically all aspects 
of banking supervision and these include:15The issuing of general rules such as principles and 
regulations; undertaking regular surveillance which excludes sovereign and isolated measures directed 
at institutions – as these are reserved for the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority; banking 
supervisory audits; ongoing monitoring of institutions16; international cooperation in coordination of 
prudential matters and crisis management roles. Regulators with combined regulatory and supervisory 
roles such as the Federal Reserve, or supervisory systems where the central bank and regulator are 
closely involved in supervision, such as that which exists in Germany, are advantageous in that such 
regulators possess more accurate, complete and timely information about systemically important 
institutions than those jurisdictions where the central bank has less involvement in regulation. 
 
 
The Central Bank’s Role in Maintaining Stability.  
 
Central bank independence has been the preferred means to facilitating monetary stability since the 
end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s and factors contributing to this include: Fact that in 
the EU, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union made legal central bank independence a conditio 
sine qua non to participating in European Monetary Union. This is in addition to the other four criteria 
of economic convergence and the additional requirements regarding fiscal responsibility. The second 
factor emanates from the skills, expertise and superior qualifications of central bankers when 
compared to those of politicians.17 The separation or combination of the roles of the central bank as 
lender of last resort and supervisor constitutes a controversial topic. It is argued that whilst a 
supervisory authority like the Fed Reserve has greater likelihood to possess “institution specific 
information” which is vital for performing the LLR role effectively, it is also susceptible to regulatory 
capture.18 Furthermore, supervisory authorities such as the Bank of England and the European Central 
Bank are considered to be less vulnerable to the possibility of being captured, but not so well informed 
about impending liquidity or solvency problems in systemically prone and important financial 
institutions.19 
 
In addition to its monetary policy setting functions, there are many reasons in favour of the central 
bank also acting as supervisor20 and these are as follows: That the central bank must have concern for 
the efficient working of the payments system and that as a result, it should also supervise and regulate 
at least the main money-market commercial banks at the heart of the system; that any rescue or 
liquidity crises will usually require quick injection of cash-which can only be done by the central 
bank. For this reason, it is argued that the central bank and supervisory body work closely together and 
                                                 
14 Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision’ Monthly Report 
(September 2000) p 34 
15 ibid 
16 This involves the evaluation of documents submitted by institutions; auditors' reports pursuant to section 26 
KWG, annual financial statements, as well as performing and evaluating audits of banking operations in 
order to assess the adequacy of institutions' capital and risk management procedures and the appraisal of 
audit findings ( Division 2 , Section 7 of KWG). Ongoing monitoring of institutions are to be performed by 
the Bundesbank's regional offices; For more on this, see The Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking 
Supervision Monthly Report September 2000 p 34 
17 See RM Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Financial Stability 2006 45-46  
18  See for example Buiter ‘Central Banks and Financial Crises’ at page 120 
19  ibid 
20 C Goodhart and D Schoenmaker  ' Institutional Separation Between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies ' 
(Financial Markets Group Special Papers 1992 )140-141; CAE Goodhart The Emerging Framework of 
Financial Regulation (1998) 249 
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that this can best be achieved through internalising the supervisory body within the central bank; and 
that separation would involve wasteful duplication as there is bound to be a lot of overlap between 
areas of interest of and information required by and accessible to both the supervisor and the central 
bank.  
 
Arguments for separation include: Where government financing is required for any large rescue, 
politicians and the Ministry of Finance are likely to be involved. For this reason, it is important for the 
central bank to become more independent in the conduct of monetary policy and less politically 
involved in its supervisory role; that bank failures affect credibility and the central bank requires 
credibility in conducting its monetary policies;  and where concerns for the micro-level health and 
stability of parts of the banking system might affect the aim of the central bank’s conduct of monetary 
macro-policy – that is, where there is conflict of interest between the combination of monetary and 
regulatory function. 
 
 
As a result of its business relationships with credit institutions, its local presence and its general 
proximity to the market, the Bundesbank has deep insights into the financial sector and possesses 
knowledgeable, qualified staff who deal with issues relating to the financial market and its stability.21 
It is therefore not surprising that the German Parliament approved the Bundesbank's involvement in 
banking supervision in section 7 of the Banking Act.22 As well as being involved in the supervisory 
process, the Bundesbank is also involved in matters relating to supervisory policy-making. As a 
member of the Financial Markets Regulatory Forum, it is acknowledged as an authority that together 
with BaFin is responsible for the stability of the financial system.23 
 
 
As a result of the Bank of England Act 199824, the Bank of England has a limited role in the 
regulation and supervision of banks. A review of the extent of the Bank of England’s role in bank 
regulation has achieved partial realisation with the introduction of the 2009 Banking Act. 
                                                
 
 
The Need for a Special Resolution Regime 
 
The Northern Rock crisis highlighted problems which were inherent in the tripartite arrangement 
between the Treasury, the Financial Services Authority and the Bank of England for dealing with 
financial stability which includes amongst others, the inability of the Bank to act as lender of last 
resort for a limited time without such a role being made public. The consultation paper issued in July 
2008,25 as a response by the authorities to the Northern Rock Crisis and to strengthen the U.K. 
framework for financial stability, envisaged a leading role for the Bank of England in the 
implementation of a special resolution regime for banks.26 
 
The establishment of a “special resolution regime” which should enable the seizure of a failing bank 
and facilitate all or part of its business to be transferred to a “bridge bank” which would manage 
services for customers, is also a consequence of the Northern Rock crisis. 
 
The Banking Act 2009 received Royal Assent on the 12 February 2009 – legislation having been 
introduced into Parliament on the 7 October 2008.27 As well as formalising the role of the Bank of 
 
21 http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_bafin.en.php (last visited 11 July 2007) 
22 ibid 
23 ibid 
24 Whereby powers related to the supervision and regulation of banks were transferred to the Financial Services 
Authority 
25 HM Treasury, Bank of England and FSA, 2008, “Financial Stability and Depositor Protection: 
Further Consultation,” July 2008. 
26 See W Nier, ‘Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from the Crisis’ IMF 
Working Paper WP/09/70 April 2009 at page 21 
27 See <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/fin_banking_act2009.htm> (last visited 7 June 2009) 
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England in its oversight of systemically vital payment systems, the Banking Act 2009 has also resulted 
in statutory powers being granted to the Bank of England, in respect of its responsibility for financial 
stability.28 The Act is divided into eight sections which deal with the special resolution regime, bank 
insolvency, bank administration procedures, inter bank payment systems and the Financial 
Compensation Scheme. 
 
The special resolution regime, which constitutes the focal point, in respect of measures aimed at 
dealing with failing banks, is the new statutory and permanent regime which consolidates temporary 
measures introduced by the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 (BSPA) which was implemented 
as a means of exercising control and bringing Northern Rock into temporary public ownership in 
February 2008. According to Part 1, section 1 (1) of the Act, the purpose of the special resolution 
regime for banks is to address the situation where all or part of the business of a bank has encountered, 
or is likely to encounter financial difficulties. The special resolution regime consists of 29 three 
stabilisation options,30 the bank insolvency procedures31 and the bank administration procedures.32 
 
The Act not only consolidates the tripartite arrangement as established under the 2006 Memorandum 
of Understanding, but is also evidential of the extension of the Bank of England’s role in the 
supervisory process .33 This is reflected in sections such as those of 7 and 8 of the Act, which clarify 
responsibilities in relation to the exercise of powers. In respect of bank insolvency procedures, an 
insolvency order may be made only on the application of the FSA with the consent of the Bank of 
England, or on the application of the Bank of England.34 Further, before exercising insolvency powers 
in respect of a residual bank, the FSA is required to give notice to the Bank of England.35 
 
 
 
Central Bank Independence  
 
Central bank independence is considered as a means of achieving the goal of price stability.36 It is also 
interesting to note that Lastra recommends the inclusion of regulatory powers in any law which truly 
safeguards independence.37 This would infer that central bank independence would be ensured if the 
central bank was responsible for both monetary policy setting and regulatory functions – hence price 
stability would be better facilitated through a central bank whose powers not only consisted of 
monetary policy setting  functions, but also of regulatory and supervisory functions. The strong record 
held by the Deutsche Bundesbank and in particular, the pre-1999 Bundesbank in maintaining price 
stability is reiterated.38 However, the difficulty in finding a central bank whose independence is 
absolute is also noted.39 In as much as certain events and developments make it difficult to ensure that 
                                                 
28 Regulatory and supervisory responsibilities had been formally passed to the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) under the Bank of England Act 1998 
29 Section 2 of the Act 
30 See section 1 (3a-c) : These are a) transfer to a private sector purchaser b) transfer to a bridge bank, and c) 
transfer to temporary public ownership  
31 As stated under Part 2 
32 As provided under Part 3 
33 See < http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/mou/fsa_hmt_boe.pdf> 
34 See section 117(2) of the Act 
35 See section 157 of the Act 
36 See RM Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Financial Stability 2006 45-46  
37 ibid at page 46 
38 ibid at pages 51-61 
39 The Bundesbank's scope for independence has been restricted as a result of two major developments namely: 
The German unification and the European Monetary Union. In the case of German unification, the issue 
concerned national identity, not price stability. The Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary 
System was sacrificed in order to achieve the greater national objective of unifying the German people. With 
regards to the European Monetary Union, supranational integration was held to be more important for the 
future of the German nation than the maintenance of an independent central bank. For further information on 
this, see ibid at 58-61. Lastra highlights the fact that the independence of the Bundesbank has seldom been 
sacrificed on the basis that the economy was suffering.  
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a central bank's independence is absolute, developments such as conglomeration and globalisation 
have warranted the need for the involvement of a single regulator. However, this is a function which if 
not absolutely carried out by the central bank, should still, to a great extent, involve the central bank. 
 
 
 
There appears to be greater support for central bank independence when compared with independence 
granted to supervisory and regulatory agencies. Even though there is and there has been support for 
central bank independence – particularly with reference to independence from political interference, 
there is still some reluctance to grant independence to financial regulators and supervisors.40 
According to Hüpkes and others, it is more difficult for financial regulators to design accountability 
arrangements than it is for central banks.41 In their opinion, the reluctance by policy makers to grant 
independence to supervisory and regulatory agencies is attributed to three factors.42 
 
The significance of central bank financial independence as a component of overall independence has 
been emphasised by the European Union.43 According to Buiter44 two types of central bank 
independence exist, namely, target independence and operational independence. Four aspects of 
central bank independence are considered by Smaghi45namely, functional, institutional, personal and 
financial independence. For the purposes of the discussion in this paper, operational and financial 
independence will constitute the focus of discussion. 
 
Central bank Financial Independence 
 
Financial independence involves the independence of the central bank - when considered from the 
perspective of the funding of its activities and the exercise of its powers.46 In Amtenbrink’s view, the 
central bank’s legal basis may facilitate a system whereby a government which has been elected 
democratically determines the boundaries within which the central bank should decide on an actual 
capital increase.47 However, the success of such an arrangement would be dependent on the existence 
of a key factor, namely, the bank’s independence from the government at the time when the actual 
need for re capitalisation occurs.48 Furthermore, central bank financial independence would be 
safeguarded where the central bank is not dependent on the government’s general budget but is able to 
address the needs of its financial operations through its own generated income.49 
 
According to Smaghi,50 legal provisions alone are generally not adequate to guarantee the appropriate 
level of central bank independence – the respect for independence and its boundaries, amongst parties 
                                                 
40 See EHGHüpkes, M Quintyn, M Taylor, ‘The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Theory and 
Practice 2006 at page 1 
41 ibid, preface 
42 ibid at page 1; The three factors include: Firstly, the fact that independent regulatory and supervisory agencies 
could become another branch of government which is not subject to the same level of scrutiny as that which 
is prescribed to the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Secondly, without adequate regulatory 
oversight, regulators may favor industry interests over those of the public – hence facilitating the possibility 
of a “regulatory capture” occurring. Thirdly, self interest may contribute to policy makers’ reluctance to 
giving up their oversight functions. 
43 See P Stella and A Lönnberg, ‚Issues in Central Bank Finance and Independence’ IMF Working Paper  
WP/08/37 and in particular, the European Monetary Institute’s report EMI (1998) “Convergence report” at 
page 295 
44 See W Buiter, ‘What’s Left of Central Bank Independence?’ < http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/05/whats-
left-of-central-bank-independence/> (last visited 10 June 2009) 
45 See LB Smaghi, ‘Central Bank Independence in the EU: From Theory to Practice’ European Law Journal, 
Vol. 14, No. 4, July 2008 
46 See R Smits, ‘European Central bank Institutional Aspects’ 1997 Kluwer Law International at page 157 
47 F Amtenbrink, ‘Securing Financial Independence in the Legal Basis of a Central Bank’ at page 6 
48 ibid 
49 ibid 
50  See LB Smaghi, ‘Central Bank Independence in the EU: From Theory to Practice’ European Law Journal, 
Vol. 14, No. 4, July 2008, p. 446 
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involved, also being an important factor . He considers four elements of central bank independence, 
namely, functional, institutional, personal and financial independence.51 Furthermore, he goes on to 
state that: 
 
“The concept of financial independence should therefore be assessed from the perspective of whether 
any third party is able to exercise either direct or indirect influence not only over the tasks of a central 
bank but also over its ability (understood both operationally, in terms of manpower, and financially, in 
terms of appropriate financial resources) to fulfil its mandate.”52 
 
 
Ensuring absolute independence with central bank financial independence also constitutes a difficult 
task. This is illustrated by the close links which exist between the central bank and the Treasury in 
many countries. Is it possible for a central bank to operate effectively - given the presence of absolute 
independence? The importance of close collaboration and exchange of information between the 
tripartite authorities in the UK (the FSA, the Treasury and the Bank of England) was highlighted by 
the Northern Rock Crisis. These, if effective as they should have been, could have helped, not only in 
identifying the problems which existed at Northern Rock53, but to facilitate timely intervention which 
would have averted the scale of the crisis.  
 
Operational independence 
 
This is defined as “…the freedom or ability of a central bank to pursue its objectives (regardless of 
who sets them) as it sees fit, without interference or pressure from third parties.”54 In order for such 
independence to be effective, it is also argued that freedom from political influences is vital.55 As is 
the case with financial independence, absolute independence is extremely rare given the fact that the 
central bank, in many jurisdictions, is connected in one way or the other to the State and the sovereign. 
Illustrating with the scenario which exists in the UK, the central bank is owned by the Treasury56 and 
several checks, for example, the role of the Treasury in underwriting risk attending emergency 
lending, are vital to ensuring accountability in matters relating to the central bank’s position.57 
Furthermore, regional and global developments are factors which may contribute to the status of 
independence attained by a central bank. For instance, the Bundesbank's scope for independence has 
been restricted as a result of two major developments namely: The German unification and the 
European Monetary Union.58 
 
Arguments for and against central bank independence  
 
Arguments in favour 
 
1) Need to ensure that central bank can act freely in pursuit of its objectives without interference 
from political pressures or other third parties. 
 
                                                 
51  ibid 
52  ibid at 452 
53 It should be added that a lot of factors contributed to Northern Rock’s collapse – amongst which are the 
inadequacies of the measurements under Basel 2 and issues related to liquidity. 
54 See W Buiter, ‘What’s Left of Central Bank Independence?’ < http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/05/whats-
left-of-central-bank-independence/> (last visited 10 June 2009) 
55 ibid 
56 W Buiter Central Banks and Financial Crises (Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 
symposium on “Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System” at page 40 
57 See P Stella and A Lönnberg, ‘Issues in Central Bank Finance and Independence’ IMF Working Paper 
WP/08/37 
58 See RM Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Financial Stability 2006 at page 58 
 9
Where operational independence exists, excessive interest rate cuts resulting from political pressures 
could be avoided.59 However, excessive interest rates cuts may not be consequential of political 
pressures as they may arise through the application of the precautionary principle. 
 
Other factors which may contribute to excessive interest rate cuts include extreme sensitivity to 
matters relating to the financial sector (which indicate “cognitive regulatory capture”) and failures by 
strategic members of the FOMC to comprehend adequately the way in which the interest rate 
mechanism should operate (hence an inappropriate application of the mechanism)60. At times of high 
uncertainty, appropriate application of the interest rate mechanism as a tool of monetary policy should 
be timely, decisive and flexible and should focus on the principal risk.61 
 
Arguments against 
 
1) This could lead to abuse of powers. The level of independence granted should 
correspondingly be justified by sufficient checks and balances. 
2) Regulatory capture: Bank collapses such as BCCI and Barings raised concerns regarding 
the ability of the Bank of England , as supervisor to separate itself adequately from the 
culture of the banking industry in order to enable it function as a truly independent 
supervisor and regulator.62  Due to lack of transparency, the kind of regime under which 
the Bank of England operated then, as regulator, a regime of informal and negotiated 
enforcement, was prone to two forms of abuse.63 Firstly, it could degenerate into the 
capture of the regulatory system by the regulated, and secondly, it could conceal selective 
enforcement and possible harsh treatment of less significant regulatees.64 
3) Close collaboration with other authorities may be vital to ensuring that complete, adequate 
and timely information relating to systemically relevant individual institutions is obtained. 
 
Provided adequate balances and checks are in place to guard against any abuse that could result from a 
grant of independence, impediment to close collaboration between regulatory authorities should be 
overcome. Furthermore, adequate mechanisms of accountability should help to avoid a situation 
whereby regulatory capture could occur. 
 
 
 
Having highlighted the fundamental role contributed by central banks to the regulatory and 
supervisory process and the importance of central bank independence, measures aimed at safeguarding 
an extension of such powers should be in place. 
 
Measures adopted in the aftermath of the recent crises 
 
Following the introduction of the 2009 Banking Act in the UK, the following measures which are 
aimed at ensuring greater independent accountability, have been adopted correspondingly with an 
extension of the Bank of England’s powers in regulation:  
 
1) A new Financial Stability Committee (FSC), which is a product of the Act and which is a sub 
committee of the Court of Directors.65 It comprises of the Governor of the Bank, deputy 
                                                 
59 W Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises (Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 
symposium on “Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System” at page 113 
60 ibid at pages 113,114 
61 See ibid pages 53 and 54; For further information on optimal decision making under uncertainty and whether 
regulator’s focus should be directed at extreme risks, also see ibid at page 54 
62 See Treasury and Civil Service Committee, Sixth Report: “The Regulation of Financial Services in the UK” 
House of Commons, (1994-1995) 332 para 108 
63 C Hadjiemanuil, Banking Regulation and the Bank of England 1995 Lloyds of London Press at page 182 
64 ibid 
65  see < http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2009/048.htm> (last visited 11 June 2009) 
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governors and four non executive directors appointed by the chair of the Court.66 The 
functions of the Committee as stipulated in the Act are:67 To make recommendations to the 
Court of Directors, which they shall consider, about the nature and implementation of the 
Bank’s strategy in relation to the Financial Stability Objective; to give advice about whether 
and how the Bank should act in respect of an institution, where the issue appears to the 
Committee to be relevant to the Financial Stability Objective; in particular, to give advice 
about whether and how the Bank should use stabilisation powers under Part 1 of the Banking 
Act 2009 in particular cases; to monitor the Bank’s use of the stabilisation powers; to monitor 
the Bank’s exercise of its functions under Part 5 of the Banking Act 2009 (inter-bank payment 
systems), and any other functions delegated to the Committee by the Court of Directors for the 
purpose of pursuing the Financial Stability Objective. 
 
2) Efforts are being undertaken to facilitate the Bank’s access to supervisory information with the 
Treasury indicating that the Bank will be able to make recommendations to the FSA in respect 
of its framework for regulation and supervision.68 
 
 
3) The Turner Review which not only elaborates on ways in which responsibilities of a macro 
prudential nature could be allocated between the Bank and the FSA, but also on how this 
could be implemented.69 
 
In Germany, the perception that the allocation of responsibilities between the Bundesbank and BaFin 
had lacked clarity and transparency resulted in the issue of a new Memorandum of Understanding in 
February 2008.70 This followed a series of government bailouts of state owned banks in 2008 – which 
in part, was attributed to the systemic importance assumed by such banks and the potential disastrous 
consequences which could occur if they had been allowed to fail.71 Close links exist between member 
banks of the German Savings Banks Finance Group (Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe) and as long as they 
are in the position to do so, they are required to bail each other out. The problem which existed at the 
time resulted from the fact that many of these banks were facing financial difficulties – hence were not 
in the position to assist other member banks.72 
  
 
The crisis faced by IKB, Landesbanken and Hypo Real Estates not only revealed an absence of a 
special resolution regime for banks, but also raised the issue of optimal measures which could be 
implemented to control (in part) privately owned, but publicly-sponsored or (in part) publicly owned 
financial enterprises.73  
 
 
Counter cyclical instruments 
 
As well as a consideration of the Special Resolution Regime and central bank independence, the need 
to adopt counter cyclical instruments has been brought to the fore as a result of the flaws inherent in 
Basel 2. According to Goodhart74, “Central banks cannot achieve price and financial stability with one 
                                                 
66 ibid 
67 ibid 
68 See W Nier, ‘Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from the Crisis’ IMF 
Working Paper WP/09/70 April 2009 page 21 
69 ibid 
70 See W Nier, ‘Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from the Crisis’ IMF 
Working Paper WP/09/70 April 2009 at pages 21 and 22  
71 http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,536635,00.html 
72 ibid 
73 W Nier, ‘Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from the Crisis’ IMF 
Working Paper WP/09/70 April 2009 at page 22 
74 CAE Goodhart., “Central banks’ function to maintain financial stability: An uncompleted task,” VoxEU.org 
(June 24, 2008), http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1263. 
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instrument (interest rates). A counter-cyclical regulatory system is needed to dampen asset booms and 
to smooth busting bubbles”. Problems resulting from a reliance on the interest rate as an instrument of 
monetary policy were revealed through the failure of the ECB and the Bank of England to implement 
such an instrument to organise a “substantially globally coordinated interest rate cut in 2008.75  
 
Counter cyclical instruments such as the Spanish pre-provisioning measures and the use of time 
varying loan to value (LTV) ratios have been identified as the only counter cyclical instruments which 
currently operate.76 Goodhart highlights the fact that accounting standards such as those of the IFRS  
and the IASB have impeded the potential of the Spanish pre provisioning measures.77 Furthermore, 
criticisms in introducing counter cyclical variations in LTVs or capital/liquidity requirements have 
also been highlighted.78 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Given these considerations, it could be deduced that preventive measures such as those of interest rate 
facilities and counter cyclical measures should not be relied on, in their entirety. For legal provisions 
to function effectively, safeguards aimed at ensuring central bank independence are not only 
necessary, respect for such safeguards is required. As highlighted in the introduction, adequate balance 
will have to be struck by ensuring that accountability mechanisms, whilst not placing regulators in a 
position where they become prone to “capture”, are also implemented and applied to facilitate the 
necessary level of information interchange between the regulator and regulated institutions. The need 
for remedial measures such as that of the special resolution regime become all the more important. 
Whilst it is evident that necessary action should be undertaken to prevent a scenario where remedial 
measures should be implemented, it is also necessary to have precautionary measures. 
According to Paramo79, a line should be drawn between both (what the central bank can and cannot 
do) “..in terms of the goals that specific measures are designed to achieve (which should be compatible 
with the mandate of the central bank) and in terms of the level of risk taken (which should be 
compatible with the ability of the central bank to absorb risk without jeopardising its financial 
independence)”. 
Central banks have vital roles to play in the maintenance of price stability, achieving and maintaning 
stability within the financial system, and the provision of liquidity. As well as the possibility of the 
central bank assuming roles as catalysts for private rescue measures, a coupling between extraordinary 
liquidity measures and non standard monetary policy measures has been recommended.80  
 
 
 
 
75  The 8 October 2008 cut was considered to be extremely inadequate, See J Muellbauer, ‘The Folly of the 
Central Banks of Europe’ October 2008 <http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2488> (last visited 10 June 
2009) 
76  See Goodhart, Charles A.E., “Central banks’ function to maintain financial stability: An uncompleted task,” 
VoxEU.org (June 24, 2008), http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1263. 
77 ibid 
78 ibid 
79 J González-Páramo, ‘Managing risk: The role of the central bank in a financial crisis’ Speech given at Risk 
Europe 2009 Frankfurt am Main, 4 June 2009 <http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2009/html/sp090604.en.html> 
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